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I. INTRODUCTION

The study of post-conflict Kosovo presents an important opportunity
to distill lessons that can provide guidance for future post-conflict, transitional administrations. The lessons-learned from an analysis of any
post-conflict setting are many and varied. The goal of this short paper is
limited to the identification of key lessons-learned in the effort to reestablish the judiciary and rule of law in post-conflict Kosovo. Even
within this limited setting, this paper is not intended to provide exhaustive coverage of the issue. Rather, it is intended to provide the reader
with basic information and central themes that are essential to a discussion of the challenges before the international community in Kosovo
and identify potential approaches of more general application for the
future.
In the early days of the transitional administration, the effort to rebuild the judicial system and establish the rule of law suffered from a
number of challenges to its credibility and legitimacy. The transitional
administration lacked adequate human resources and was forced in
some respects to rely on local expertise in key areas where expertise and
experience were lacking. At the same time, the administration failed to
involve generally the local population in areas where ownership in the
transition process was crucial to the administration's success. Reluctance to involve local input may be attributable to the acknowledged
uncertainty as to Kosovo's final status and affiliated concerns, but regardless, the result was a number of ad hoc measures instituted by the
administration in response to issues as they arose. These measures frequently met with resistance from the local population, and consequently,
efforts to establish a stable, interim legal system have foundered.
A substantial number of these measures fall within several basic
categories: 1) applicable law and the lawmaking process; 2) judicial infrastructure and personnel; and 3) accountability for war crimes
committed during the conflict. While these themes may overlap in some
respects, they nonetheless represent categories with discrete concerns of
central importance to the establishment of the rule of law. The discussion of each of these issues builds to some extent on the others, and
taken together, they describe core fundamental issues that are essential
to an understanding of justice in a post-conflict situation.
The experience in re-establishing the legal system in Kosovo highlights a number of areas where the international community's response
did not properly address the extant post-conflict conditions. A number
of the problems experienced by the international community could be
avoided in future situations by using a more developed, phased ap-
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proach, which ultimately allows for full participation by the local population, but in the short-term relies on international standards and
expertise. In the beginning, there would be the immediate, emergency
term with internationals controlling the process followed by a gradual,
methodical transition to an intermediate term where locals assume control of the process. The key to the success of such an approach is a
mutual understanding between the affected population and the international community of their rights and responsibilities in each phase and
in the general process of transition. If the international community can
incorporate key lessons-learned from Kosovo into its approach to postconflict transitional administration, the shortcomings of the Kosovo operations may be the basis for future successes.
II.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Upon the conclusion of the NATO airstrikes in June 1999, the
United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, establishing a transitional civil administration in Kosovo, the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).' This Resolution
sets up a system comprised of four substantive components. Three of
these components are led by non-UN organizations, but still fall under
UN overall jurisdiction, and are organized as follows: the UN heads the
civil administration, the European Union (EU) addresses reconstruction,
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is
tasked with institution-building and democratization, and the UN High
Commission for Refugees had been charged with humanitarian affairs,
but this component has since been disbanded.2 In early July 1999, Bernard Kouchner was appointed to head UNMIK as the Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and in February 2001,
Hans Haekkerup took over as his successor.'
III. APPLICABLE LAW
As part of his first official legal act (UNMIK Regulation 1999/1),
SRSG Kouchner identified the applicable law in Kosovo to be Federal
1.

S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244

(1999).
2. United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, UNMIK at 18 Months, at
http://www.un.org/peaceIkosovo/pages/unmikl2.html (last visited April 12, 2001).
3. Prior to Kouchner, UNMIK was headed by Acting Special Representative, Sergio
Vieira de Mello. United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, Chronology, at
http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kos30day.html (last visited April 12, 2001).
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Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)/Serbian law to the extent this body of law
is not inconsistent with international human rights standards. Establishing the law to be applied was particularly important at this time due to
the fact that security forces from different countries were neither policing nor conducting arrests according to a uniform standard. However,
the manner in which the law was determined raised further issues. Regulation 1999/1 did not provide guidance on how to reconcile the
FRY/Serbian law with international human rights standards. At the time,
the SRSG did not have the resources to conduct such an analysis and the
local legal community did not have the expertise In addition, the initial
lawmaking process did not include any formal mechanism for soliciting
Kosovar input from interested constituencies or the general public.6
Thus, the selection of FRY/Serbian law was made without consulting
those who would be applying the law or those who must submit to it,
and questions concerning its compatibility with relevant international
human rights standards were not addressed at that time.
In August 1999, the provisional Kosovar Albanian judges, appointed
by UNMIK, began to protest openly against the presumed application of
FRY/Serbian law. Among these judges, the SRSG's selection of applicable law was considered tantamount to re-establishment of the prior,
oppressive FRY/Serbia regime.' The resistance to FRY/Serbian law resulted in confusion in the legal system.8 The interim judges, the Kosovo
4. See On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, sec. 3, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REG/l 999/1 (July 25, 1999); at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/
reg l.html.
5. This lack of resources immediately placed the SRSG in a difficult position vis Avis
stated UN policy. The Secretary General's Report in July 1999: "In assuming its responsibilities, UNMIK will be guided by internationally recognized standards of human rights as the
basis for the exercise of its authority in Kosovo. UNMIK will embed a culture of human
rights in all areas of activity, and will adopt human rights policies in respect of its
administrative functions." Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the
United Nations Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., Doc. S/1999/779 (12 July 1999),
para642.In August 1999, the SRSG formed the Joint Advisory Council on Legislative Matters (JAC/LM), a body comprising Kosovar legal professionals and in-country representatives
of legal assistance providers. Although the JAC/LM was designed to solicit Kosovar input
into segments of the interim rulemaking process in Kosovo, no procedures were put in place
for communication between the Kosovar representatives on the JAC and the general public.
7. "This decision outraged numerous Kosovar judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, who
refused to apply the discriminatory Serbian Criminal Code..." International Crisis Group,
Starting from Scratch in Kosovo: The Honeymoon is Over 12 (1999), available at
http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/Kos3 I rep.htm.
8. "[UNMIK Regulation 1999/1] generated widespread opposition from Kosovar leaders, including many of the judges appointed to be part of the emergency judicial system...
[and] as a result of the confusion and dissension, few judicial proceedings got underway
under the emergency judicial system, and in those proceedings that occurred, different laws

were applied by different judges." UNITED
ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT 6 (2000).

STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Kosovo

JUDICIAL
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Implementation Force (KFOR), and the UNMIK Civilian Police each
applied a diverse collection of legal provisions and standards, including
FRY/Serbian law, pre-1989 criminal law, and Albanian criminal law, to
alleged perpetrators of crimes. Consequently, many trials were delayed
and the alleged perpetrators of crimes remained in detention for extended amounts of time. 9
On December 12, 1999, the SRSG adopted Regulations 1999/240
and 1999/25," which identified applicable law to be the law in force in
Kosovo prior to March 22, 1989, and repealed the provision of Regulation 1999/1 applying contemporary FRY/Serbian law.' 2 With this
decision, UNMIK identified an acceptable body of law and effectively
ended the question of which law to apply. However, this decision was
not made, nor was the issue resolved, until the transitional administration had been on-ground for six months. This delay expended valuable
goodwill and credibility, and it did not resolve the issue of compatibility
with international human rights standards.
A review of the process of selecting the applicable law highlights several difficulties that continue to plague UNMIK's attempts to restore the
judicial system. First, UNMIK imposed a body of law that was not perceived as ethnically neutral. The negative repercussions of this action were
compounded by the lack of Kosovar input into the legislative process
more generally.'3 Both contributed to a sense of disenfranchisement
9. The OSCE's Legal System Monitoring Section (LSMS) noted that UNMIK Regulation 1999/26 extending detention period is a "clear breach" of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, LEGAL SYSTEMS
MONITORING SECTION, Kosovo: REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FEBRUARY-

JULY 2000 11 (2000) [hereinafter OSCE LSMS]. For a more detailed discussion of the legal
issues, see OSCE LSMS, REPORT No. 6: EXTENSION OF TIME LIMITS AND THE RIGHTS OF
DETAINEES: THE UNLAWFULNESS OF REGULATION 1999/26 (Apr. 29, 2000).

10. On the Applicable Law in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/24 § 1 (1999);
available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg24.html.
I1. Amending UNMIK Regulation No. 1991/1 On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/25 § 1 (1999); available at http://www.un.org/

peacelkosovo/pages/regulations/reg25.html.
12. This date is significant because it marked the date when Kosovo lost its autonomy

under the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
13. Kosovar involvement in the legislative process has been recognized as a necessity
for the success of the UNMIK administration. The Independent InternationalCommission on
Kosovo report stated: "Kouchner and his officials can wield this authority at their discretion,
appoint and dismiss Albanian officials, determine which laws are to be applied and which are
not, or override, should they feel compelled to do so, the decisions taken by the elected bodies of the future. Yet given the complexity of contemporary society, it is almost impossible to
implement policy and to sustain legitimacy without cooperation with, and indeed reliance on,
local experts and persons of influence." INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, AND LESSONSLEARNED 114 (2000). The early days of the UNMIK administration were not known for their
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among the Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs that remains pervasive.
Second, both the conduct of trials according to varying laws" and the
instances of extended pre-trial detentions' 5 were contrary to international
due process standards. 6 Third, UNMIK does not have the technical resources to engage in rapid, scholarly analysis of the compatibility of
proposed laws with international standards.' 7 These shortcomings called
into question the international community's commitment to implementing the very human rights standards that were the genesis of its
involvement. During the crucial formative period, a sense of disenfranchisement, violations of fair trial standards, and a lack of technical
resources had deleterious effects on the credibility and legitimacy of
UNMIK and the judicial system.
IV. JUDICIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL

Compounding the problems of determining applicable law were the
physical infrastructure limitations arising out of the conflict. The NATO
air-strikes and violence in Kosovo inflicted significant damage on much
inclusiveness generally. The International Crisis Group noted, "[C]ountless internationals
and Kosovars have complained that UNMIK administrators still do not reach out or even get
out of their offices nearly enough, that, in general, Kosovars are not routinely consulted."
International Crisis Group, supra note 7, at 11.
14. The OSCE LSMS identified a number of fundamental examples of this problem,
ranging from differing treatment of witness statements to removal of co-defendants from
court. OSCE LSMS, supra note 9, at 20-21. In the case of Baskaya and Okquoglu v. Turkey
(Applications nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94), the Eur Ct. H.R. (1999), The European Court of
Human Rights held that uncertain legal standards were contrary to Article 7 of the ECHR.
Crimes must be clearly defined in law. The court noted:
When speaking of "law" Article 7 alludes to the very same concept as that to which the
Convention refers elsewhere when using that term, a concept which comprises statutory law
as well as case-law and implies qualitative requirements, notably those of accessibility and
foreseeability (see the Cantoni v. France, 15.11.1996, Reports 1998-V, no. 20, pp. § 29; the
S.W. and C.R. v. the United Kingdom judgments of 22 November 1995, Series A nos. 335-B
and 335-C, pp. 41-42, § 35, and pp. 68-69, § 33, respectively).
Para. 36. When courts within the same jurisdiction choose different substantive bodies of
law and/or standards, no charitable definition of "accessibility" or "forseeability" could be
said to be met.

15. OSCE LSMS, REPORT No. 6: EXTENSION OF TIME LIMITS AND THE RIGHTS OF DETAINEES: THE UNLAWFULNESS OF REGULATION 1999/26 (29 April 2000).
16. See id. and OSCE LSMS, supra note 9, at 20-22.
17. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, A FragilePeace: Laying the Foundationsfor
Justice in Kosovo 3 (1999)("The UN is short of legal staff as well as skilled translators urgently needed for the legislative reform process"); at http://www.lchr.org/pubs/
kosovofull 1099.htm.
18. The International Crisis Group noted: "This emerging, inauspicious cynicism with
regard to the involvement in and commitment to establishing a viable legal system for Kosovo points back to what might be called the Achilles heel of the entire international mission."
International Crisis Group, supra note 7, at 13.
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of the physical infrastructure of the region. Many of the court facilities,
equipment, legal texts, and other materials necessary for an operating
legal system had been destroyed. In addition, the basic utilities necessary for the society and courts to function, such as electricity, water, and
telephone service, had been decimated. Many of the court buildings that
remained intact at the end of the conflict were appropriated by international organizations for other uses. This lack of facilities, equipment,
and materials posed a substantial obstacle to the convening of efficient
and effective trials. 9
In addition to the deficiencies in the physical infrastructure, judicial
expertise in Kosovo was sorely lacking. Prior to the conflict, the vast
majority of judges were Kosovar Serbs. Following the conflict, few
Kosovar Serb judges remained in Kosovo, and those who did were
largely unwilling to serve. The Kosovar Albanian legal professionals had
little recent experience as judges or prosecutors. Since the revocation of
Kosovo's autonomy in 1989, virtually no Kosovar Albanian legal professionals had been allowed to enter the legal system, and Kosovar
Albanian attorneys who practiced their profession did so mainly in the
private sector, primarily as defense counsel.'
In response to the manpower shortage, one of the first actions of
UNMIK was to establish an emergency judicial system. In an emergency decree on June 28, 1999, the Acting Special Representative
established the Joint Advisory Council on Provisional Judicial Appointment mandated to make recommendations for 3-month, renewable
appointments of judges and prosecutors.2' The first round of these emergency appointments was conducted on June 30, when nine judges were
named to serve in a mobile court. Over the course of the next three
months, additional appointments were made to staff the District Courts,
the Ad Hoc Court of Final Appeal, and the Ad Hoc Office of the Public
Prosecutor.2
Directly thereafter, UNMIK moved forward with the establishment
of a permanent judiciary. In September 1999, the SRSG promulgated
two regulations calling for the creation of two commissions to facilitate
19. See generally, OSCE LSMS, REPORT No. 1: MATERIAL NEEDS OF THE EMERGENCY
JUDICIAL SYSTEM (Nov. 7, 1999); at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/law/egall .htm.
20. According to the Kosovo Chamber of Advocates, in 1990 the Serbian Ministry of
Justice suspended the offering of the bar exam in Kosovo. As a result, no new lawyers have
been admitted to the Chamber in 10 years because there has been no opportunity for them to
complete the required legal internship or sit for the professional exam.
21. OSCE LSMS, supra note 9, at 11.
22. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 17, at 8-9. The District Court in
Gnjilane did not have judges and prosecutors appointed, but rather was served by the mobile
court unit from Pristina.
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this process. UNMIK Regulation 1999/7 dissolved the Joint Advisory
Council and in its place established the Advisory Judicial Commission
on Appointment of Judges and Prosecutors (AJC) 3 The AJC was mandated to advise the SRSG on the appointment of, and complaints
against, judges and prosecutors. The second commission, the Technical
Advisory Commission on Judiciary and Prosecution Service (TAC), was
mandated to assess the long-term requirements of Kosovo regarding the
number, level, and categories of judicial bodies.24 The results of this assessment were presented to the SRSG in December 1999. In the period
from January to August 2000, the SRSG appointed 662 judges, lay
judges, and prosecutors.
Although in just over one year UNMIK had been able to fill over
600 vacant positions in the judiciary, these personnel still lacked the
necessary training to conduct trials in accordance with international
standards. Due to their prior international isolation, the new Kosovar
judges and prosecutors were unfamiliar with the relevant human rights
standards, and therefore, they were not equipped to identify provisions
of the applicable law that should be superseded by applicable international human rights law. 2 The SRSG met the problem of inadequately
trained local judges in two ways: the establishment of a training institute
(later formalized as the Kosovo Judicial Institute), and the institution of
international judges in February 2000.26 The international judges and
prosecutors were to serve a dual interim function ensuring the application of international standards in Kosovo and serving as examples to
local judges of what would be expected of them in terms of efficiency,
application of equal standards, and treatment of minorities.

23. United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, On Appointment and Removal
From Office of Judges and Prosecutors,U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/7 § 1; at http://
www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg7.html.
24. United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, On Recommendations for the
Structure and Administration of the Judiciary and the Prosecution Service, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REG/1999/6 § 5; at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg6.html.
25. "The main reason for the courts' reluctance to use and refer to human rights law
seems to be a lack of knowledge of the law, both in its substance and on how to implement it
in practice." OSCE LSMS, supra note 9, at 18.
26. Continuing tensions in the Mitrovica area prompted the SRSG to sign UNMIK
Regulation No. 2000/6, appointing international judges and prosecutors to the Mitrovica
judicial district. According to this Regulation, the international judges have the authority and
the responsibility to perform the functions of their office, including the authority to select
and take responsibility for new and pending cases within the jurisdiction of the court to
which he or she is appointed. The same authority is given to the international prosecutors
within the functions of their office. United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, On the
Appointment and Removalfrom Office of InternationalJudges and International
Prosecutors,U.N. Doc. UNIMIK/Reg/2000/6, at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/
regulations/reg06.html.
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The introduction of international judges provided its own set of
challenges. While the international judges were experienced with international standards, they were unfamiliar with the applicable law.
Furthermore, their number and dispersal was erratic, once again detracting from the international community's attempt to enforce one set of
internationally-recognized standards." Finally, the presence of international judges was unfortunately reminiscent of the "parallel system" the
Kosovar Albanian community had struggled so long against.
This situation fostered the same lack of confidence in UNMIK and
the legal system as that which arose in relation to the applicable law
question described above. Inconsistent application of the laws by a
combination of both local and international judges made it difficult for
defense counsel to mount a defense, particularly as they themselves
were not well-versed in either the applicable international standards or
the applicable law in force.
In addition, allegations quickly arose that certain judges were being
improperly influenced,28 and the necessary transparent judicial disciplinary procedures were nonexistent. While Regulations 1999/7 and
2000/6 outline the grounds for the dismissal of local and international
judges, respectively, neither outlines specific, transparent complaint
procedures.29 The OSCE LSMS has identified numerous, dramatic
shortcomings in trial procedures;3 ° but the translation of these observations into concrete reforms has been slow at best. As a result, from its
inception, the fledgling judicial system suffered a variety of challenges
to its credibility, giving both internationals and locals substantial cause
to question the very viability of the system itself.3

27. "[T]he limited number of international judges, their sporadic distribution and the restricted scope of their powers still fail to adequately address the impartiality concerns."
OSCE LSMS, supra note 9, at 69. The LSMS noted that this resulted in "unequal treatment
of the defendants." Id. at 70.
28. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 17, at 2-3.
29. On Appointment and Removal From Office of Judges and Prosecutors, supra note
23, at 3; On the Appointment and Removal from Office of InternationalJudges and International Prosecutors, supra note 26, at 1;The OSCE LSMS noted, "Despite domestic law
provisions and Regulation -1999/7, there is no effective system for the investigation and removal of judges and public prosecutors*" OSCE LSMS, supra note 9, at 61.
30. OSCE LSMS, supra note 9, at 20-22.
31. Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/5/2000 (3 March 2000), paras. 60, 109, & 110 [hereinafter
Report of the Secretary General]; see also INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
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THE
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FOR WAR CRIMES

Prior to and during the international conflict, human rights abuses in
Kosovo were nightly news. This phenomenon demonstrated a clearly
commendable international concern that eventually brought international pressure to bear on the Serbian government. However, it also
presented a puzzling array of information. While there was a general
sense that abuses were prevalent, their precise dimensions were not
clear. This lack of clarity caused some to question the accuracy of certain alleged atrocities.32 Following this type of conflict, the issues of
prosecution, reconciliation, and restitution may to a large extent depend
upon quantifiable data, which reveal important patterns and trends in the
overall human rights picture.
In the aftermath of the sort of conflict experienced by Kosovo, the
justice system can play a central role in restoring order, instilling democracy, and preventing future violence. To accomplish this role, the
justice system must meet the population's demand for justice for crimes
perpetrated during the conflict. To do so, the data concerning the alleged
atrocities must be amassed and examined in a way that instills confidence in the local community. The manner and degree to which a justice
system addresses the population's sense of vulnerability and injustice
fundamentally affects the pacification and reconciliation process.
Immediately after the onset of hostilities, a number of nongovernmental organizations began to collect information on human
rights abuses in Kosovo. There was some formal collaboration in data
collection between the NGO community and multilateral institutions in
an attempt to harmonize efforts and to follow a standard format approved by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY). These organizations proceeded to publish their findings in both
qualitative and quantitative form.33 However, collection of the information is only the first aspect of accountability. With respect to war crimes
and crimes against humanity, the affected society and the international
community need to have the events not only recognized, but acted on.

32. The presence of a debate on the particulars should not be allowed to obscure the fact
that large scale human rights abuses were prevalent. See Report of the Secretary General,
supra note 31, at Annex I.

33. E.g.,
& AMERICAN

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW INITIATIVE
ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, POLITICAL KILLINGS IN
KosovA/Kosovo MARCH-JUNE 1999 (2000), available at http://hrdata.aaas.org/kosovo/pk/
[hereinafter POLITICAL KILLINGS IN KosovA/Kosovo]; ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE, Kosovo/KosovA AS SEEN AS TOLD (1999); INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
GROUP, REALITY DEMANDS (2000).
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Building on the experiences elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, the
international community recognized that the ICTY would not be the
sole, or even primary, organ for investigation and prosecution of war
crimes alleged to have been committed in the region. 3" Rather, much of
this work would be done either entirely locally, or by international
NGOs. However, continued ethnic tensions in Kosovo impeded the progress of war crimes prosecutions in the domestic courts. For instance,
Kosovar Serb defendants were unwilling to allow themselves to be defended by Kosovar Albanian defense lawyers. As a result, international
defense lawyers, primarily from Serbia, were brought in to defend the
Kosovar Serb defendants.
UNMIK's response to the need for credible neutrality in the proceedings was the proposed creation of the Kosovo War and Ethnic
Crimes Court (KWECC).35 As an interim tribunal addressing serious
ethnic and war crimes offences, the KWECC was to be a key factor in
international efforts to assist the entire Kosovar population to move past
ethnic division and toward reconciliation. Based in part on concepts underlying the ICTY and the Human Rights Chamber in Bosnia, the
KWECC was designed to ensure international involvement and oversight in ethnic and war crimes cases. To accomplish this goal, it was to
be staffed with multiethnic national and international judges, prosecutors, and staff. The KWECC was to have jurisdiction over war crimes,
crimes against humanity, genocide, and serious crimes committed on the
grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, association with an ethnic minority, or political opinion. However, in September 2000, the
United Nations quietly discarded efforts to form the KWECC, despite
having put significant effort into its establishment, relying instead upon
the international judges and prosecutors in the five judicial districts in
Kosovo. 36
As the international community struggled with the question of how
to best address war crimes cases on a local level, war crimes trials
commenced in District Courts without adequate personnel, security, interpretation, and equipment. Consequently, a sophisticated review of the
data collected to date was not a realistic goal. This limitation combined
34. Statement by Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia on the Investigation and Prosecution of Crimes Committed in Kosovo,
ICTY Press Release, 29 September 1999. Carla Del Ponte stated, "[P]rimary focus of the

Office of the Prosecutor must be the investigation and prosecution of the five leaders of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia." She went on to note the concurrent jurisdiction of the ICTY and national tribunals.
35. UNMIK ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE JUSTICE SYSTEM OF Kosovo (2000).
36. CEELI Update (Winter 2001, forthcoming).

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 22:371

with the modest involvement of the ICTY and the fact that key alleged
perpetrators remained at large in Serbia raised serious questions about
the resolve and ability of the international community to pursue accountability both locally as well as internationally. It became
increasingly difficult to conceive of circumstances in which all of those
guilty of war crimes would be brought to justice.
Again, the legitimacy of the international administration suffered,
for the same states leading the administration were perceived to have
failed to address the core abuses that lay at the root of the entire conflict. The local situation decayed further as a result of a number of wellpublicized incidents in which many alleged perpetrators detained on
charges of war crimes escaped from pretrial detention. 7 Because of this
inability to effectively address war crimes issues in the emergency
phase, the opportunity to hold the perpetrators accountable was compromised at the local level, and serious doubts emerged as to the
commitment of the international community to address the issue more
generally.
VI. LESSONS-LEARNED

A. Applicable Law

The failure of the UN to address the lawmaking process quickly and
effectively created an array of problems. However, these problems were
not entirely unforeseen. During an initial assessment mission in midJuly 1999, representatives from ABA/CEELI and the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) drafted a discussion memo addressing the
question of applicable law in Kosovo. The two primary issues raised
were: "(1) how can the "applicable law" be defined, established and disseminated in an expedient manner to the legal professionals who will be
responsible for its enforcement; and (2) given the importance of the
Kosovar community's inclusion in the legal reform process, how can
their participation and support be encouraged.' These issues enjoyed
support from relevant representatives of the OSCE and the Council of
Europe (CoE) in-country at the time. Though unsolicited, the memo received some circulation through appropriate channels within UNMIK,
but implementing actions were limited at best.3 9 In fairness to the SRSG,
37. UN in Kosovo Dismisses Director of Detention Centre Following Escape of Prisoners (Sept. 5, 2000), at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/99/sepOO lI
a.htm.
38. ABA/CEELI-USDOJ, Request for Clarification and Offer of Assistance to the
SRSG, July 1999(On file at ABA/CEELI).
39. See, e.g., Letter from SRSG Kouchner to Council of Europe, dated 20 July 1999
(Requesting the CoE evaluate the compatibility of FRY/Serbian criminal law with interna-
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it was not readily apparent where he would be able to find the necessary
resources to rapidly assess the compatibility of FRY/Serbian legislation
with international human rights standards, but the incorporation of local
participation in the lawmaking process, while difficult in some respects,
did not present a significant resource challenge.
The process of defining the immediately applicable law and establishing an accepted lawmaking process should be undertaken prior to the
next post-conflict administration. The next administration should deploy
with these strategies in place. In the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), ° submitted to the UN
Secretary General on August 17, 2000, the UN itself conceded the need
for this type of preparation, with a phased approach to implementation.
The Brahimi Report suggested that, in the immediate emergency phase,
the international community should enter with a pre-prepared, standard
legal template. To enhance the perception of neutrality, all provisions
included in this template should be based on international fair trial and
due process standards. This template can serve as the applicable law
until adequate permanent legislation can be identified and/or developed.
Such a template should focus on basic criminal offences and criminal
procedure. In addition, the procedures outlined should take into account
the availability, or lack thereof, of qualified legal professionals. 4' The
Brahimi Report recognizes that Kosovo posed an example of a situation
where a pre-packaged, skeletal legal system could have been instituted
in an interim period, during which the
region's law could be amended and brought into compliance with international standards. 2
In this emergency phase, the international community also should
commit to the establishment of an official legal publications office and
distribution network, thereby dramatically increasing the public's awareness of the early steps taken by the administration. In Kosovo, such basic
tional human rights standards). The SRSG also authorized the establishment of the Joint
Advisory Council for Legislative Matters. See supra note 5, at para. 42.
40. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), submit-

ted to the UN Secretary General on August 17, 2000, U.N. Doc. A/55/305/S/2000/89 (2000);
availableat http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace-operations/docs/summary.htm.
41. One problem encountered early on in Kosovo was the applicable criminal procedure
code provision calling for trial panels of three judges. As a result, in order for trials to commence, a large number of judicial personnel were needed. See OSCE MISSION IN Kosovo,
DEPT. OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW, RULE OF LAW DIVISION, OBSERVATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS AT THE

OSCE LSMS,

REPORT

No. 2:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

Kos-

15 DECEMBER 1999) (Dec. 17, 1999), at
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/law/legal2.htm.
42. "[The Mission's] tasks would have been much easier if a common United Nations
justice package had allowed them to apply an interim legal code.., while the final answer to
the "applicable law" question was being worked out." Brahimi Report, supra note 40, at 13.
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efforts at transparency in the decisionmaking process would have gone a
long way toward decreasing the appearance of the re-institution of a
"parallel system." In addition, the international community should
commit to a regular slate of public affairs programming discussing major legal developments. This last effort could, by necessity, be conducted
in stages, as not every public information outlet may be ready to receive
this information in the early days of the international community's entry
into the situation. However, very early on in post-conflict Kosovo,
community councils were created in most major cities and village centers in the province.43 Public hearings or town hall meetings would have
been both possible and inexpensive in Kosovo.
As soon as the interim code is in place and disseminated, the administration should embark upon a legislative drafting process, which
includes a substantial public participation component with the goal of
developing a body of permanent, acceptable law. This process should be
sequenced to address the basic foundation legislation (i.e., criminal and
criminal procedure codes, civil and civil procedure codes, etc.) in the
near term and move to more specific legislation in the intermediate
term. The key to the ultimate success of this endeavor is the input of the
local population. This input allows for ownership by both those who will
enforce the law and those who must submit to it. In the Kosovo example, a greater commitment to collaborative decisionmaking and
solicitation of Kosovar input by UNMIK would have substantially decreased the resistance that met many of the administration's early
decisions.
B. JudicialInfrastructureand Personnel
The UN's experience in Kosovo also showed that in the short-term,
it is unrealistic to rely on local physical and personnel capacity when the
foundation of basic legal knowledge and administration has been decimated. In such situations, it is not practical to envision establishing a
comprehensive legal system by immediately appointing local judges,
creating a training body, and creating a monitoring body. The existence
of the interim, emergency period needs to be fully recognized. During
this emergency period, the international community should be prepared
to use well-trained international jurists while local personnel are identified and trained. While UNMIK did institute an emergency judicial

43. UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, STRATEGY FOR Kosovo 2001-2003 18 (2000). In the immediate post-conflict period, the United States Agency
for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives assisted in the creation of
over 200 community improvement councils.
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system, it relied initially on local capacity, which was neither extensive
nor fully qualified.
In terms of equipment, the OSCE and its donor governments made
arrangements for the distribution of some equipment at the outset. However, these efforts did not come to fruition until late in 1999, and they
did not match the increasing demand created by UNMIK's rapid efforts
to fill all judicial vacancies. When deploying a transitional administration, the international community should be prepared to send a group of
international judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel pre-trained in the
emergency law template, 4 and this transitional judiciary should be accompanied by a targeted package of equipment sufficient to support the
interim judiciary's functions. This package would in turn provide an
equipment base for locals as they assume responsibilities within the judicial system.
Once this system is in place, the administration should shift its focus to identifying a core cadre of local legal professions for intensive
training. Small groups of active judges will be more manageable for
training, monitoring, and mentoring. Judicial training in post-conflict
areas, especially those in post-communist countries, must be interactive
and focused on issues that newly appointed judges will confront in their
courtrooms. The urgency of the situation makes standard, theory-based
lecture models unworkable. In the near term, as this core group of
judges is trained, they should be paired with international judges as part
of a mentoring program. In addition, this group should serve as trainers
for their peers as additional judges are identified and appointed.
Despite this training, there can be no doubt that any judicial system
assembled from the ground up will encounter difficulties. Systems must
be in place to monitor and deal with such problems from the onset of the
transitional administration. The international judges, as well as the new
judges once phased in, should be monitored by an independent monitoring body.45 In the instance of Kosovo, the OSCE LSMS deserves high
44. The Brahimi Report also notes that there should be a standing group of legal experts
prepared to deploy as a mission's justice team and that these personnel should be pre-trained
in the interim legal template. This same pre-selection, vetting, and training should apply not

only to the judicial advisors to the mission, but to a group of international jurists, available
for immediate deployment simultaneous with the transitional administration. See Brahimi
Report, supra note 40, at 13, 21.

45. UNMIK is engaged in the process of developing a supervisory body, the Kosovo Judicial Council, which would serve that function. However, a CoE analysis of the draft raised
concerns about the SRSG domination of the Council and the impact of that on independence
of the judicial branch. See Comments on draft regulation No. 2001/XX on the establishment
of the Judicial Council of Kosovo, PCRED/DGI/EXP (2001) 4 Restricted. This issue has
proved problematic in Bosnia for a number of years, and the international community has
recently attempted to address this issue through a new body, known as the Independent Judi-
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praise for its accomplishments with limited resources. Nonetheless, it
was only able to aggressively monitor a fraction of the trials. Monitoring
endeavors must be properly funded and lead decisively to action. The
judicial system must have transparent appellate and disciplinary processes that react to identified shortcomings and abuses.
The post-conflict justice system must demonstrate to the population
that, first and foremost, it will uphold human rights standards and hold
accountable those who violate them. Public confidence in the justice
system is of utmost importance in the wake of violent, internal conflict.
Retribution and vigilantism are direct outgrowths of the society's sense
of helplessness and lack of recourse, either actual or perceived. Access
to, and impartiality of, the justice system is one manner by which the
population gauges its ability for recourse. The re-establishment of a judicial system using specially-trained, international jurists, while local
legal professionals are trained and then mentored, provides a foundation
for a basic judicial system capable of immediately applying international standards and ensuring accountability. The ability of the justice
system to function effectively immediately following a conflict becomes
even more imperative in those instances where war crimes investigations
and prosecutions will be likely.
C. Accountabilityfor War Crimes
In the wake of violent ethnic conflict, war crimes and crimes against
humanity cannot be treated in the same manner as standard criminal
cases. There is a particular urgency and complexity that surrounds
crimes committed in the course of ethnic conflict. There is also a short
timeframe in which important information must be gathered before it is
lost. The international community's response to these challenges has the
ability to quell or exacerbate residual tensions within the local community.
The first step in the process of addressing massive violations of
human rights is the collection of information that can be used to publicize
the events or to hold the perpetrators accountable in some manner. The
work of truth commissions, commissions of inquiry, and other similar
bodies elsewhere in the world has brought to light the important role
that documentation plays in reconciliation. The data collection process
should begin as soon as it is possible to interview the victims of abuses;
this can be during the conflict and/or in the immediate aftermath. One
primary lesson learned in Kosovo regarding this documentation process
cial Commission. This body is to be "an international oversight body for judicial reform."
Press Release, Office of High Representative (14 March 2001).
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is the power of cooperation among NGOs collecting and publishing
data. Such collaboration leads to a larger pool of comparable information. If data is collected in varying formats, while useful for qualitative
reporting, it is not conducive to amalgamation and quantitative analysis.
Quantitative analysis can identify patterns of abuses that can be used as
evidence by international or local judicial bodies or accountability
mechanisms such as truth commissions. In the case of Kosovo,
ABA/CEELI and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) conducted an advanced quantitative analysis of data on
killings in Kosovo, collected by several influential non-governmental
organizations. Its provocative findings demonstrate poignantly the efficacy of pooling NGO human rights data. "6
If the post-conflict environment calls for the information to be acted
on by a judicial body, the complexity and sensitivity surrounding these
crimes necessitate an unbiased, highly-trained group of judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel. In Kosovo, the necessary qualifications were
not present among the existing local legal professionals and the training
regimen for all legal actors in such efforts (defense lawyers, judges, and
prosecutors) was insufficient to the task. UNMIK responded to this
situation with the institution of international judges and prosecutors.
However, this action was inadequate to meet the challenges present.
First, it was belated. Second, there were insufficient numbers, and the
distribution was sporadic. The case of Kosovo highlights the need for
the immediate formulation of proper judicial and enforcement bodies
comprising well-trained international legal experts, who are prepared to
maintain proper detention facilities, conduct investigations, and hold full
trials.
Moreover, the international community has yet to prove that the alleged perpetrators residing outside of Kosovo will be brought to justice.
So long as the ICTY's scope remains limited and the resolve of the
international community on this issue is subject to question, the issue of
ultimate accountability will remain unresolved. Consequently, members
of the international community seeking to administer Kosovo's transition will do so with impaired credibility and effectiveness. At the very
least, leaders within the international community must express unequivocally their resolve to receive proper accounting from the current
Serbian government, which houses the majority of the alleged perpetra46. In POLITICAL KILLINGS IN KosovA/Kosovo, ABA/CEELI and AAAS estimate that
approximately 10,500 Kosovar Albanians were killed during the conflict. This examination
was in turn linked to an analysis of refugee flows. The results of this comparison provide
credible evidence of a centrally-coordinated campaign of ethnic cleansing. Supra note 33, at
1-2. The Center for Peace through Justice, Human Rights Watch, and Physicians for Human
Rights shared their data to make this analysis possible.
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tors. Furthermore, to be credible, this expression of resolve should reference the substantial amount of data assembled and include a demand
that this data be specifically reviewed and incorporated into the pursuit
of accountability.
VII. CONCLUSION
Failure to establish a responsive and efficient judicial system as part
of the transitional administration in Kosovo eroded local support for
UNMIK and the international community at a time when it was most
needed. The international community should not have expected that international human rights standards, unfamiliar to a poorly trained
judiciary, would be upheld in trials, particularly when there was not an
adequate disciplinary process for judges who act or adjudicate improperly. Similarly, it must be recognized that if citizens do not know the
laws, do not understand how to access the legal system, and do not see
that system acting fairly and impartially, it leads to disillusionment with
the international community. The international community should be
prepared to shoulder the responsibility for achieving these goals in the
immediate emergency period.
In future post-conflict transitional administrations, the international community should initially expect to bring international
resources and expertise to bear in lieu of relying on local capacity. At
the same time, the international community must begin soliciting input
from the local population and providing training. These resources must
be targeted at all facets of governance, including the judicial system. In
the emergency period, following the cessation of hostilities, the legal
system will likely lack both the necessary infrastructure and personnel
to address the society's need for justice. Thus, during this period, the
judicial system should be staffed by a group of international legal professionals, familiar with international human rights standards and
trained in a pre-existing legal template. For this to be possible in the
future, steps will need to be taken in advance to assemble a pool of
qualified, committed professionals.
Following the emergency period, international involvement should
be phased out as local capacity increases. This process must be accompanied by an open dialogue between the transitional administration and
the local population on the status of the legal system and the reform
process. Mutual understanding among the international community and
the local population regarding the starting conditions, the phased approach, and the ultimate goals of the legal reform process will serve to
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harmonize expectations and promote the legitimacy of the transitional
administration.
Finally, the international community must anticipate the need for
accountability and firmly demonstrate a long-term commitment to
achieving this crucial component of any reconciliation effort. Naturally,
there will be debate about the precise nature and dimensions of the
abuses involved. However, the victims and alleged perpetrators are entitled to a process that addresses all the relevant data involved, and this
process must comport with relevant international standards. International commitment to this process must be sustained and demonstrable
both within the affected locale and abroad. The failure to do so jeopardizes the entire enterprise.

